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Corporate Security Responsibility
Towards a Conceptual Framework for a
Comparative Research Agenda
KLAUS DIETER WOLF,
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND 
STEFAN ENGERT
ABSTRACT
The political debate about the role of business in armed conflicts has
increasingly raised expectations as to governance contributions by private
corporations in the fields of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-
conflict peace-building. This political agenda seems far ahead of the re-
search agenda, in which the negative image of business in conflicts, seen as
fuelling, prolonging and taking commercial advantage of violent conflicts,
still prevails. So far the scientific community has been reluctant to extend
the scope of research on ‘corporate social responsibility’ to the area of
security in general and to intra-state armed conflicts in particular. As a
consequence, there is no basis from which systematic knowledge can be
generated about the conditions and the extent to which private corpor-
ations can fulfil the role expected of them in the political discourse. The
research on positive contributions of private corporations to security
amounts to unconnected in-depth case studies of specific corporations in
specific conflict settings. Given this state of research, we develop a frame-
work for a comparative research agenda to address the question: Under
which circumstances and to what extent can private corporations be
expected to contribute to public security?
Keywords: conflict; corporation; private governance; security 
Introduction
Our aim in this article is to analyse the potential role of business corporations
in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building in con-
flict zones.We review the literature on ‘business in conflict’ to take stock of the
current state of research in order to move forward towards a conceptual
framework for a comparative research agenda in the field of corporate secur-
ity responsibility (CSecR), i.e. the potential contribution of business corpor-
ations to the provision of the public good ‘security’. CSecR has only recently
been discovered as a relevant area of transnational private governance.
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Private corporations are involved in armed conflicts in manifold ways, and
particularly in civil wars — mostly, it seems, by contributing to security prob-
lems rather than to their solution (Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 85; Möckli 
et al., 2003a: 51; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 35). Companies get involved
in conflicts by financing conflict parties, trading conflict-relevant goods and
exploiting regulatory gaps.1 But fuelling violence is only one side of the poten-
tial role of business corporations in armed conflicts.The other side is that they
seem to be increasingly ‘drawn into playing public roles to compensate for gov-
ernance gaps and governance failures at global and national levels’ (Ruggie,
2004: 30). But given that private corporations pursue private purposes, the
question is: Under what circumstances and to what extent, if at all, can they be
expected to provide regulatory governance functions in the public interest?
The political security discourse about the role of business in armed con-
flict has increasingly directed public attention to the role private corpor-
ations could play in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict
peace-building. According to United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, this role can be ‘crucial, for good and for ill’.2 Under the conceptual
umbrella of ‘global governance’, the UN has taken the lead in mobilizing
the problem-solving resources of private actors, international civil society
and business alike, for the provision of public goods. With the relatively
prominent place it has given to private contributions to security as a public
good, this political agenda seems to be far ahead of the research agenda. So
far, the scientific community has been reluctant to extend the scope of
research on ‘good corporate citizenship’, ‘corporate social responsibility’ or
‘transnational private governance’ to the area of security in general and to
intra-state armed conflicts in particular. From a theory-guided interest in
generalizing across sectors, this is all the more astonishing, because security
obviously is a ‘hard case’ for private self-regulation as a meaningful com-
plement, or even substitute, for public governance. Overstretch and ‘busi-
ness failure’ can be found more frequently in this policy field than in any
other, and so might the conditions of such failure. But so far there is no real
basis from which systematic knowledge can be generated about the condi-
tions under which and the extent to which private corporations can fulfil
the role expected of them in the political discourse. Confronted with cor-
porations’ undisputed contributions to destabilization, to fuelling, prolong-
ing and taking commercial advantage of violent conflicts, on the one hand,
and with high-flying expectations as to their potential contributions to
security (see Gerson and Colletta, 2002; Nelson, 2000), on the other, the
question concerning the circumstances under which private actors can
make meaningful contributions to public security ought to be investigated
within the framework of a comparative research agenda.
In this article, we contribute to such a framework. Section 1 is a critical
assessment of the current state of research. Section 2 describes general changes
in the relationship between private corporations and conflict and suggests a
more active role of business in the provision of ‘security’ in general. Questions
are raised as to the potential contributions of private actors to the provision of
public security more specifically. In section 3 we focus the analytical lens on
two dependent variables which the research agenda on corporate security
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responsibility should address: corporate engagement (commitments and be-
havioural changes with regard to security) in conflict zones and the impact of
this engagement (narrowed down as a first shortcut to the reduction of phys-
ical violence). Turning to the discussion of independent variables, in section 4
we address factors that could be relevant in explaining corporate engagement
(corporate variable 1) in conflict zones. In section 5, we deal with corporate
impact (dependent variable 2) by formulating conjectures about potential
explanations of the effects of different types of corporate engagement on 
conflict. Finally, in section 6 we outline the way forward for comparative
research and the theoretical conceptualization of the key issues.We argue that
development of a conceptual framework for a theory-oriented CSecR
research agenda must face the challenges of filling the empirical gap left by
the current state of research, of clarifying key concepts, addressing more
systematically the causal dimensions that underlie the motivations of corp-
orations, and of including the normative dimension of private contributions
to public goods.
1. State of the Art: Empirical and Theoretical 
Underpinnings of CSecR
Today, business is increasingly being confronted with — either voluntary or
involuntary — withdrawal of the state from the provision of security, with
declining governmental authority and even disintegration of the state.While
many private companies have used the new freedom resulting from economic
globalization rather negatively — namely by deliberately or unintentionally
financing war economies3 — others have assumed a new role in preventing
conflict and reducing the level of violence. However, this development can
only be understood against the background of a general change in the nature
of conflict, often associated with and at least accelerated by the end of the
Cold War.Today, about 90% of armed conflicts are intra-state civil wars.They
challenge the authority of governments or take place on territories where
domestic consolidation processes such as nation-building or democracy-
building have not yet succeeded (Daase, 2003: 177; Möckli et al., 2003a: 51).
The institutions of the state fail to provide public security, either because
they lack the resources or because they profit from insecurity themselves, as
is the case of the so-called shadow states or over-extended states (cf. Reno,
2000: 47). Not only have these ‘new’ wars (Kaldor, 1999) led to a perpetu-
ation of so-called war economies, they have also challenged the conflict-
management strategies of the international community, which are still
orientated towards traditional wars. Against the background of failing state-
structures on the one hand and the increasing intermingling of political and
economic motives within these conflicts on the other, private contributions
to the provision of public security were explicitly addressed in March 2001,
when the first of the Global Compact ‘Policy Dialogues’ was convened on
the role of ‘Business in Zones of Conflict’. Foreign investors, in particular the
extractive industries, were called upon to promote the principles of the Global
Compact in such zones and not to associate themselves with international
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corruption or bribery. They were to engage in conflict impact management.
A ‘Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management’
was drawn up in order to raise awareness of how investment decisions could
affect a given conflict situation. In April 2004, even the UN Security Council
dealt with ‘The Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping
and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’ and established a working group to deal
with the topic. Given the mixed success of the international community in
addressing these new kinds of conflict in the past, the business sector is
increasingly perceived as a promising and much-needed complement to the
activities of states and civil society actors. But these high-flying political
expectations are not matched or even grounded in systematic research on
the role of business in conflict.
Selection Bias and Lack of Comparative Research
Concerning the current state of research on corporate security responsibility,
commentators complain that the role of the private sector has received too
little attention (Berdal and Malone, 2000: 1). ‘No coherent “big picture”
exists’ (Sherman, 2001: 5) about why and how corporations engage in the
provision of public security.Although a considerable number of descriptively
rich individual country case studies have been published (see Ganser, 2004a:
64–9), they focus mainly on the negative impacts of corporations on conflict
(e.g. their role in fostering civil war).4 This strand of research critically inves-
tigates how businesses cause destabilization or prolong conflict in order to
maximize profit — by selling arms, by providing military services, by financ-
ing governments or rebel groups, or by just exploiting the regulatory gaps
resulting from the decline of public authority (see Elwert, 1997; Rufin, 1999;
Zangl and Zürn, 2003). In contrast, there are hardly any case studies address-
ing how corporations have contributed proactively to the provision of public
security.This is by no means a normative complaint, but expression of a deep-
seated analytical concern: the existing selection bias does not allow for a
systematic identification and testing of possible independent variables and
causal mechanisms (cf. Banfield et al., 2003: 27, 66; Rieth and Zimmer, 2004a:
2; Ganser, 2004b: 74; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 35) and therefore leaves
the potential contribution of business to peace largely ‘untapped’ (Wenger
and Möckli, 2003).
In order to generate theoretically sound knowledge about the potential
role of business in conflict zones, we must be able to draw upon empirical
evidence of proactive private contributions to public security as well. By
not covering the full range of variation of the dependent variable, the state
of the existing literature is still an impediment to the comparative theory-
oriented research that is needed to test the factors explaining corporate
engagement and its impact systematically. Furthermore, between-case vari-
ance (e.g. cross-country/region, cross-corporate and cross-conflict studies) as
well as within-case variance — longitudinal analyses of periodical changes of
the variables, such as change in corporate behaviour over time — are also
absent. One could assume that the virtual lack of ‘positive’ case studies is
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due to the fact that there are hardly any such cases around. This would be
puzzling, however, when one considers the relevance and increasingly
precarious nature of security and of a stable environment for private com-
panies. Previously agreed private self-regulatory mechanisms, such as the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for the trade of diamonds, or the
Wolfsberg Principles on which private financial sector institutions have
agreed in order to combat money laundering, also point in another direction.
In addition to the selection bias resulting from the concentration on nega-
tive cases, another common feature of current research is the widespread
lack of reference to generic concepts (Rose, 1991: 454f.) for hypothesizing
when, how and why business actors engage in conflict zones, and under what
conditions they are likely to contribute successfully to the provision of pub-
lic security.Although some first conceptual contributions exist,5 the depend-
ent and independent variables still seem under-specified. For example, most
of the literature uses the catch-all term ‘conflict prevention’ to cover contri-
butions to security in pre-conflict, actual conflict and post-conflict situations
(Carbonnier, 1998; Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 27, 32; Rieth and Zimmer,
2004a: 1, 4, 8; 2004b: 81). However, it may be useful to distinguish between
these phases of a conflict for explaining and assessing certain forms of cor-
porate engagement in providing security.The lack of ‘positive’ case studies may
also reflect the yet unclear and diffuse understanding of what actually con-
stitutes a ‘successful’ corporate contribution to conflict prevention, peace-
keeping and post-conflict peace-building. Other merits and shortcomings
may be attributed to the fact that much of the existing literature has
evolved from activist groups, while academia has remained relatively ‘silent’
(Humphreys, 2003: 14) on the role of business in conflict zones.6
2. Incentives for Providing Security: The Complex and Changing
Relationship between Business and Conflict and Security
Why should private companies take an active role in providing security as a
public good in the first place? And why should we expect public actors to
call upon them and thereby deliberately give up or outsource their exclusive
competence for a public good so closely related to the core of state sover-
eignty? In contrast to the state, which is public in form and purpose, and
even to actors from civil society who, although private in form, often pursue
public purposes, private business corporations are not only private in form,
they are also private in purpose. For anyone who subscribes to Milton
Friedman’s often-quoted view that ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase its Profits’ (1970), it is paradoxical to expect corporations, whose
aim is in maximizing shareholder wealth, to serve public purposes (Fort and
Schipani, 2003: 394; Dunfee and Fort, 2003: 573). By their very nature, these
actors do not have a genuine interest in pursuing public interests. Collective
goods theory has convincingly pointed out why the market generally fails to
produce public goods (Olson, 1965). First, public goods involve free-rider
problems (Ostrom, 1990: 6). Since they are non-excludable, everybody, not
just those who provide them, can profit from them. Conversely, ‘potential
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consumers have no interest in paying for or contributing to the provision of
a good that they can benefit from even if they fail to do so’ (Krahmann,
2005: 12). Furthermore, public goods are non-rival in their consumption:
their benefit is not decreased by the amount of consumption. In contrast to
the state, which can enforce a contribution to the production of public goods
by general taxation, the market can make no profit from public goods and
hence should have no interest in providing them.
If we draw on public goods theory and follow Friedman’s assumption of 
a narrow market rationality according to which only short-term costs and
benefits motivate business activities, we cannot expect any meaningful con-
tributions by market actors to the provision of public goods. However, given
the abundant empirical evidence of private regulatory self-commitments
in the fields of social and environmental standard setting and implementation,
this reductionist rationality assumption cannot sufficiently explain the motiv-
ations of corporations. Obviously, there must be additional incentives which
are strong enough to alter firms’ perceptions of rational behaviour. Only a
more comprehensive ‘stakeholder’7 approach to the rationality of business
(Freeman, 1984) allows a systematic inclusion of these additional incentives
for private governance contributions to public security.
Business today has to operate within a public framework characterized
by public laws and a normatively textured environment. We do not have to
assume that market-oriented actors are intrinsically motivated by social
values and norms in order to claim with some plausibility that the complex
demands of social, market and political environments have altered firms’
concerns beyond short-term profit maximization. In such a multidimen-
sional environment, business has to include a bundle of factors within its
cost–benefit calculations, including the management of reputational costs,
normative expectations of stakeholders and the public. In sum, these often
contradictory demands create a type of motivation that can be termed com-
plex market rationality. From this basis, good reasons could emerge for
business engaging in the provision of public goods under certain conditions.
Among these, security still appears to be the least likely to be provided by
private actors if public actors are either unwilling or unable. However, by
taking a closer look at the changing security environment in which business
has to operate and the public good character of security itself, the motives
for corporate security engagement become clearer.
Increasing Relevance of Security and of a Stable 
Business Environment
In search of global competitiveness, northern-based TNCs accessed new
markets and invested huge sums of money in developing transition countries
in order to gain access to natural resources or to reap the small profit mar-
gins of cheap labour (Avant, 2005: 180f.). But the direct (material) and the
indirect (reputational) costs of this business strategy have increased sharply
with the spread of conflict zones (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004a: 17). Confronted
with the opportunity to realize profits, the risks of incurring substantial war
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damages and rising security costs and of being publicly associated with blood-
shed and human rights violations,8 the choice between not investing in the
first place, withdrawing from a conflict zone, or contributing to a more pre-
dictable and secure business environment, appears in a new light. Simply to
withdraw may no longer be a viable option if one assumes the further spread
of zones of terror and costs of conflict.9 Still, the decision to invest in public
security may be in the interests ‘of business’ in general, but for each individ-
ual firm it causes additional costs, competitive disadvantages in relation to
free-riders, and reduced profits. It could possibly even damage relations with
the ruling political class in the host state (Rittberger, 2004: 24). Why should
a corporation bear such additional costs by engaging in the provision of
security? There are two different lines of argument which could substantiate
the expectation of business engagement.The first starts from the assumption
of narrow market rationalism and focuses on the character of security and
the reduction of direct material costs; the second assumes complex market
rationalism and highlights the avoidance of indirect costs as a decisive
motivation. Since the latter argument is elaborated in more detail in section
4 (iii), we concentrate on the first one here.
Even if we assume a narrow market rationality, we might expect business
to engage in security provision if at least some of the above-mentioned costs
could be avoided.The key to cost reduction lies in the fact that security does
not have to be a public good. If it is commonly misunderstood as the arche-
type of a public good, this is not caused by features of security itself but
rather by the empirical observation that it is usually provided by the state.
Elke Krahmann (2005: 8–14) suggests differentiating between three differ-
ent forms of security which involve different types of goods. In its clearest
‘public good’ form, security means prevention, denoting the attempt to elim-
inate or at least reduce a threat. In this form, security is non-excludable and
non-rival, because no one can be excluded from the benefits of the elimin-
ation or reduction of a threat, nor can this benefit be diminished by con-
sumption. There are two other forms of security, however, in which these
characteristics need not be present. Security as deterrence refers to activities
that attempt to suspend the materialization of a threat. It is less concerned
with tackling the causes of a threat.This form of security can quite obviously
be excludable, as deterrence against a threat might apply only to members
of a specified ‘club’. It is non-rival, however, as all members profit from
deterrence in the same way. Security then takes on the characteristics of a
club good. Finally, security can also mean protection from an already exist-
ing threat. Security guarantees survival in spite of a threat that has already
materialized. In this form, it comes closest to a typical private good which
can be priced and offered to those who can afford it. Of course, these classi-
fications of types of goods and of forms of security have to be regarded as
ideal types, and all forms of security can be (and have been) provided as
public goods, if there is a collective actor or an institution that can ensure
their non-excludability and non-rivalry (Krahmann, 2005: 17f.). However,
this classification offers access points for the private sector to develop a gen-
eral interest in security provision. Under the assumptions of narrow market
rationalism it leads to the conclusion that business actors should be most
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inclined to the provision of security as a private or a club good, and least
likely to contribute to security as a public good.10
An extreme case in point is the involvement of private security providers
(PSPs) in zones of conflict. The role of PSPs such as Blackwater Securities,
MPRI, or DynCorp received some attention in the literature about the
security-related role of private corporations. Corporate private security
providers are a relatively new phenomenon, and the assessment of their
impact on conflict is still ambivalent (Lock, 2001: 225; Renner, 2002: 18;
Leander, 2005: 606). However, private security providers who make a direct
profit from providing security are an exceptional case. For ‘normal’ corpor-
ations, other incentives have to be taken into consideration, relating not
only to the increasing interest in the security of markets endangered by
spreading conflicts and domestic turmoil in weak states, but also to other
demands of their political, social and market environments.
Even though the provision of public goods cannot plausibly be expected
ever to become the primary goal of business (Scherer et al., 2004: 7–9), the
private sector could be instrumental in providing security, even as a public
good, in a manner similar to the voluntary self-commitments of private
corporations in fields such as the environment, health, education or human
rights (Fort and Schipani, 2001: 33; Dunfee and Fort, 2003: 579, 582, 594;
Scherer and Palazzo, 2004: 32). This expectation combines the assumption
that most companies prefer stable and secure markets, and only a few profit
from conflict or are interested in prolonging it (Ganser, 2004a: 12), with
assumptions about additional incentives for business to engage in security,
which are introduced in the following sections. However, hypotheses about
the specific conditions under which private corporations are most likely to
contribute to public security instead of merely their own private security are
still far from clear-cut and cannot be systematically assessed at this stage.
3. Focusing the Analytical Lens: What Do We Want to Explain?
Immediate Conflict Relevance: Distinguishing the CSR 
Agenda from the CSecR Agenda
Before we can even start to develop a conceptual framework for comparative
research on CSecR, a meaningful distinction has to be drawn between ‘trad-
itional’ research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the emerging
CSecR agenda. To differentiate between these two, we suggest focusing the
latter on activities in conflict zones characterized by a high level of physical
violence. This focus guides the following typological suggestions.
CSecR deals with corporations operating in a violent environment, while
CSR is concerned with corporations in a peaceful environment.This distinc-
tion, useful as it may be, is of course an ideal-typical one and can only serve
as a rough guideline. In the real world, such a line of distinction between a
peaceful and a violent environment is, of course, difficult to draw. From what
stage of development can a post-conflict zone be called ‘peaceful’, or a pre-
conflict zone ‘violent’ enough to move from the CSR to the CSecR agenda,
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or vice versa? But even when we focus the lens on corporate operations in
weakly governed and conflict-ridden states where the level of violence is
high, we have still not moved completely beyond the CSR agenda: corporate
activities in such an environment may be more directly or more indirectly
relevant to conflict. The CSR literature investigates corporate activities in
the fields of environmental and labour standards and of human rights whose
generation and implementation can, of course, also have an indirect rele-
vance for security. There may be good reasons for assuming that economic
growth, social development, political empowerment and the adoption of
environmentally and labour-friendly standards all contribute to peace in the
sense of reducing structural violence. How do we handle the inclusion or
exclusion of such activities that address potential root causes of civil con-
flicts, such as poverty, lack of distributional justice, or exclusion from the
political process? Is there a measure for the extent to which such activities
are relevant variables for conflict and the level of physical violence?
In the light of these considerations and in order not to blur the boundary
between the broader CSR agenda and the more focused CSecR agenda, our
first conclusion is to focus on contributions that are directly addressed at
regulating or influencing an environment characterized by imminent or
only very recently terminated interactions of physical violence. These may
include establishing the rule of law, the democracy and community dimension.
The trade-off implied in this choice is of course one between saving ‘conflict
relevance’ from becoming an all-inclusive — and therefore analytically use-
less — category, on the one hand, and missing or losing sight of activities that
tackle the roots of impending or latent structural violence, on the other.
Corporate Engagement and its Impact on Conflict:
Two Different Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables should be addressed by the CSecR research agenda:
corporate engagement and its impact on conflict. Engagement comprises the
(self-)commitments actors declare or agree upon (‘word’ or output dimen-
sion), and the behavioural adjustments based on such commitments (‘deed’
or outcome dimension).The second dependent variable, impact, delineates as
a first short-cut the reduction of physical violence in a conflict zone.This vari-
able may not only be more straightforward, it might also be of more practical
relevance. However, there are good reasons for taking a closer look at engage-
ment and impact because the choice of either of the two combines certain
advantages with disadvantages.
(i) Corporate Engagement. The output dimension of engagement allows us to
address research questions such as the following:When do corporations adopt
new policies towards security in a conflict zone? When do they agree on vol-
untary self-commitments such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
declaring abstention from trading or purchasing conflict goods? When do they
adopt ‘good governance’ principles to fight corruption? To address engage-
ment as output is relatively easy to handle in analytical terms, e.g. by looking
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at statements of individual companies or agreements on collective self-
commitments. But output is perhaps also the least interesting dimension of the
dependent variables under consideration in terms of its immediate political
relevance. However, looking at the output dimension of corporate engage-
ment sheds light on the articulation of governance goals; therefore the
intentions of corporate contributions to public security, i.e. the existence of a
corporate security responsibility, can be investigated more explicitly here than
elsewhere. In contrast, the outcome dimension of corporate engagement goes
beyond analysing commitments and addresses the actual behaviour of com-
panies in zones of conflict. Do they actually employ or avoid unethical prac-
tices? Do they withdraw rather than become accomplices of violent regimes
or warlords? Do they draw profit from war economies, or do they choose to
yield profits? Do they refrain from abusing, or do they take advantage of regu-
latory or implementation gaps?
(ii) Corporate Impact. In terms of political relevance, impact may be even
more interesting as a dependent variable than engagement. After all, doubt-
lessly attributable impact would offer the strongest arguments for fostering
the impetus within the political security discourse to encourage the private
sector to engage in the provision of security in conflict zones. However, the
analytical problems generated by impact analysis are manifold. They start
with the very simple question: impact on what? Who decides on the goals
which have or have not be attained, and thereby also on the criteria for a ‘pos-
itive’ or ‘negative’ impact? Such judgements could be based on the goals a
corporation (as an individual actor or as member of a collective initiative) has
defined and committed itself to; it could, however, also employ criteria
‘imposed’ from the outside, such as a researcher’s understanding of what is ‘in
the public interest’ in accordance with whichever normative categories he or
she chooses to select. A second problem has been addressed earlier: what is
a relevant security-related impact? The core which we would definitely want
to measure would include a reduced level of physical violence; but should it
also embrace a more stable and better governed political, a more sustainable
social, economic or ecological environment? Even bigger challenges for
impact analysis result from multi-causality and counterfactual reasoning: how
can we control for the universe of other factors which could explain changes
in the level of violence in conflict zones? What difference would the absence
of a given private initiative make, and how would we tell? Confronted with
the choice between trying to explain engagement or impact, the former is
clearly less difficult to develop into an operational tool, because it offers a
yardstick that avoids the complex problems of counterfactuals and multi-
causality which are inherent in studying impact.
In the following two sections, we discuss the different sets of factors that
may be relevant for explaining the multifaceted relationship between
‘business’ and ‘conflict’. In the classification suggested here, these factors
address the two different dependent variables one by one: the engagement
of business in the provision of (public) security, and the security-related
impact of certain types of corporate engagement. The following question will
guide us to an agenda for comparative research: under what circumstances can
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we expect what kind of corporate contributions to the provision of what kind
of security (engagement) with what kind of effects on the level of physical
violence (impact)?
In section 4, we first introduce the following distinctions with regard to fac-
tors that can be assumed to influence our first dependent variable ‘engage-
ment’: (i) characteristics of the actors themselves, (ii) product and production
characteristics, (iii) conditions in the political, social and market environment
in which business corporations operate, and (iv) conflict characteristics. In sec-
tion 5, we focus our attention on the ‘impact’ of corporate behaviour on con-
flict, i.e. the level of violence in conflict zones. For this purpose, we employ the
former dependent variable ‘engagement’ as the basis for distinguishing differ-
ent clusters of independent variables to which we ascribe explanatory value
for explaining impact. Drawing upon different types of engagement we claim
that (v) their forms, (vi) actors’ constellations and coalition patterns, and (vii)
the scope of activities have an influence on our second dependent variable
‘impact’. As a consequence of the state of research which does not tell us yet
whether our independent variables are truly independent or how they might
interact, we refer to ‘conjectures’ rather than ‘hypotheses’ in what follows.11
4. Explaining Corporate Engagement in the 
Provision of (Public) Security
We can roughly classify the activities and initiatives of corporations in four
forms. Corporations can proactively engage in the provision of security in
conflict zones with ‘words’ and/or ‘deeds’. Alternatively, they can decide to
withdraw from a conflict zone or even conduct ‘business as usual’ (similarly to
be analysed with regard to ‘words’ and/or ‘deeds’). Finally, corporations could
also take advantage of lacks of public regulation in conflict zones. Given the
existing state of research on CSecR, our primary aim is necessarily to assess
the potential and limitations of proactive engagement, i.e. of intentional cor-
porate contributions to public security. Therefore, our aim in this section is
to derive some conjectures about the factors that make proactive corporate
engagement for public security in conflict zones (for which we reserve the
term ‘CSecR activities’) more or less likely.12
(i) Conjectures about Actors’ Characteristics. Among the organizational fea-
tures of a company, its size, form and structure are of interest (cf. Dunfee and
Fort, 2003: 567). Small and medium-sized enterprises could be expected to
show less responsibility in the public interest because they are less ‘visible’ and
constitute a less attractive target for NGO campaigns than big transnational
corporations (cf. Carbonnier, 1998; Sherman, 2001: 10; Ballentine and
Nitzschke, 2004: 43). Small-scale, local businesses are more able to free-ride on
the reputational concerns of their competitors (Ballentine and Nitzschke,
2004: 50; cf. Lewis, 2004: 8, 26).
Conjecture 1: Large transnational corporations are more likely to engage
in CSecR activities.
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Concerning company form, we can — albeit roughly — distinguish between
family-owned companies and those listed at the stock exchange. Because
ownership is more visible and personalized in the first case, responsibility
can be attributed more directly to specific persons (i.e. the owners) as well.
In the second case, ownership is much more dispersed and to some extent
gets lost in the anonymity of shareholder values. Therefore, it is plausible to
assume that family-owned companies act more responsibly (cf. Haufler,
2001b: 670). Finally, the company structure could make a crucial difference
with regard to CSecR activities: the existence and prominence of a specific
business ethic and/or of interfaces between companies and their social envir-
onments, such as departments for CSR within companies, can be assumed
to enhance the receptiveness of firms to public expectations (Rosenstiel and
Koch, 2001: 204).
(ii) Conjectures about Product(ion) Characteristics. As far as product charac-
teristics are concerned, the ‘blood diamonds’ example demonstrated that
the image and visibility of a product (cf. Lewis, 2004: 26) must be considered
as a potential factor for a company to engage in security-relevant activities.
Companies with no known brands have few reputational incentives be-
cause the likelihood of public shaming, consumer boycotting and the sub-
sequent costs are low (cf. Sherman, 2001: 9, 15; Litvin, 2003: 287). Similarly,
the length of the supply chain should influence the likelihood of a company
engaging in CSecR activities (cf. Renner, 2002: 21; Sherman, 2001: 11). The
more production phases involved and the more a product consists of sub-units,
Conjecture 2: Individual accountability within a company increases the
likelihood of CSecR activities.
Conjecture 3: The existence of interfaces or a specific business ethic within
companies increases the likelihood of CSecR activities.
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the less likely it is that the diverse parts and, correspondingly, the whole brand
will be recognized as a ‘conflict product’.
Production type could make a critical difference with respect to material
costs as well. Due to the long-term relationship between production cycle
and return on investment, the costs of withdrawing from a conflict zone are
presumably very high in the primary sector, i.e. the extracting industries.
High sunk costs also influence a company’s decision on whether to stay in
a conflict zone or not (cf. Sherman, 2001: 8–11; Rittberger, 2004: 23). Similarly,
the existence of physical business facilities, such as pipelines, warehouses, etc.,
and a production’s dependence on human resources — especially in labour-
intensive sectors — also increase the vulnerability of companies by conflict.
In sum, the physical proximity of core business activities to conflicts, and
how immediately corporations are affected by them, may be assumed to
influence a company’s interest in CSecR activities:
A company will have less ability, usually less interest and often less legitimacy
(especially if acting independent of other companies) to intervene in conflicts
that are occurring further afield and not directly affecting its immediate oper-
ations. (Nelson, 2000: 62)
There may be a possible additional correlation between business branches
and security-related engagement, however. One could argue that the higher
the initial investment and the longer the presence of a company in a con-
flict zone, the higher its interest in public security. Moreover, the role of the
financial services sector has not yet been adequately addressed, although
banks, insurance companies and pension funds could indirectly contribute to
reducing the level of violence (or, respectively, to fuelling conflicts) by, for
instance, requiring conflict impact assessment and risk management from
their customers, or by allowing money laundering, respectively (Berdal and
Malone, 2000: 12 f.; Sherman, 2001: 13 f.; Ganser, 2004a: 15, 2004b: 71–3).
(iii) Conjecture about the Political, Social and Market Environment of Business
in Home and Host Countries. As indicated in section 2, we assume that cor-
porate security responsibility varies with the political, social and market
environment of the home and host countries in which companies operate.
A business environment is increasingly difficult to understand as a pure
market constellation in which only the avoidance of direct financial costs
and the outwitting of competitors matter. Corporations operate in a space
(‘stakeholder environment’) that is crowded by public actors (states and
Conjecture 5: The likelihood of CSecR activities increases the higher the
sunk costs and the proximity of core business facilities and
resources to conflict.
Conjecture 4: The image-dependence and visibility of a product increases
the likelihood of CSecR activities.
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international organizations), other non-governmental actors such as civil
society, customers, shareholders, and, last but not least, by other companies
that are not only rivals and competitors, but also potential cooperation
partners. All of these actors bring with them particular challenges, role con-
ceptions and normative standards that are directed towards the conduct of
business operations. Economic rationality may not be replaced by some
kind of normative orientation, but, as already mentioned, the concept of
‘market rationality’ itself is changing its meaning under the conditions of a
normatively enriched environment. Costs may be incurred through the
activities of private and public actors, e.g. through boycotts and adverse
campaigning by civil society activists, or through legally binding public regu-
lation. In order to systematize such considerations, in their research on cor-
porate social responsibility Conzelmann and Wolf (2005) differentiated
three dimensions of cost–benefit calculations to be considered in a com-
pany’s decision to engage in the contribution to the provision of public
goods:
• the direct costs associated with civil society action and consumer boycotts
• the direct costs associated with state failure and/or public regulation 
at the national and international level
• the reputation costs to be avoided, by not being associated with mak-
ing profits through exploiting and prolonging armed conflicts, in the
eyes of ‘aware’ consumers and ethically oriented investors.
All of these external (dis)incentives can also play a role in the behaviour
of business in conflict zones. As far as the costs associated with public regu-
lation are concerned, at the international level the activities of transnational
corporations are not effectively restrained (Dunfee and Fort, 2003: 580). No
general legal framework guiding the operations of companies in conflict
zones exists (Banfield et al., 2003: 56). At the national level, a distinction has
to be made between the home country and the host country, both of which
may influence the security-related engagement of a transnational corpor-
ation. Many host countries are characterized by the absence of an effective
state monopoly of power. In this case it will not be the threat of — but rather
the lack of — public regulation which can produce costs a company wants to
avoid by making active contributions to security.
Where the state fails to provide public security, direct security costs are
linked with the material (local) foundations of the firm. Conflict threatens
the company’s investments (property and staff), which in turn bring about
higher security and business costs. Costs include material damage to the
company’s local production assets (facilities, machinery, oil pipelines) or
public infrastructure (transport routes), loss or destruction of local markets,
loss of labour, staff and personnel (‘brain drain’ because of kidnapping, emi-
gration or military recruitment), and higher insurance and security payments
to avoid the possible risks mentioned (Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 107–9).
The political environment can also differ with respect to the level of cor-
ruption. Paying protection money or bribes to repressive local leaders, war-
lords or rebels (Lock, 2001: 224), or engaging their militias as security firms
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to protect the company’s assets, additionally raises costs and — as it indirectly
finances war — at the same time fuels the conflict.13 Even turnover and level
of consumption in the housing market can probably not be exempted from
the consequences of conflict or international terror (cf. Nelson, 2000; Möckli
et al., 2003a: 52).
A systematic comparison between consolidated states with functioning
governance structures and less corruption, such as Botswana, South Africa
and Namibia, and states with ‘war economies’, such as Angola, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Liberia, Cambodia, Burma and Congo (cf. Wrong, 2000; Renner,
2002: 26–31; Grosse-Kettler, 2004), could reveal the extent to which the
political–institutional environment affects the motivation and engagement
of TNCs in zones of conflict (cf. Rittberger, 2004: 18f.; Ballentine and
Nitzschke, 2004: 37).
A different political environment would be in effect if a strong repressive
host-state government existed, and the alternatives were collaboration, be-
coming an accomplice, withdrawal or working against the government. In this
constellation, the environment of the home country gains importance. Legal
liabilities are also to be included in the opportunity cost structure of con-
flict (Renner, 2002: 60; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 39), as a number of
lawsuits show that have already been brought against TNCs for alleged
human rights violations.14 A strong civil society can address a company’s
reputation and consumer loyalty as a ‘key corporate asset’ (Wenger and
Möckli, 2003: 116; Spar and LaMure, 2003) and can put ‘accomplices’ under
massive public pressure if their conduct violates shared notions of basic
social and human rights as well as environmental standards. Companies that
are unwilling to practice ‘good corporate citizenship’ risk reputational costs,
consumer boycotts,15 loss of market share, falling stock prices and alienation
from their stakeholders (Banfield et al., 2003: 16; Möckli et al., 2003a: 51;
Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 114f.; Rieth and Zimmer, 2004a: 17).16 The pursuit
of goals that are in the public interest (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 50)
thus depends on the political culture in a company’s region of origin (cf.
Pauly and Reich, 1997) and on the likelihood of public shaming at home.
Thus, because of the higher risk of naming and shaming, as well as consumer
boycotts, OECD-based companies are more likely to engage in the public
interest than firms with home countries outside the OECD (cf. Ballentine and
Nitzschke, 2004: 42). Companies originating from consolidated democratic
Conjecture 7: The higher the degree of NGO activities in a company’s
home country, the more likely a company will engage in
CSecR activities.
Conjecture 6: The higher the degree of host state failure, the more likely
a company will engage in CSecR activities.
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states are likely to pursue ‘good’ ends out of ‘good’, i.e. normative, and ‘bad’,
i.e. instrumental, reasons.Where public scrutiny and the potential for shaming
are high, liberal human rights norms are generally accepted and normative
self-commitments are often already incorporated in the internal organization
of the firm (Renner, 2002: 40–5; Litvin, 2003: 300; Ballentine and Nitzschke,
2004: 42; Lewis, 2004: 8; Scherer et al., 2004: 18; Scherer and Palazzo, 2004: 31).
The market environment might also have an influence on a company’s
decision to engage in CSecR activities. In highly competitive markets, com-
panies probably eschew all kinds of self-regulatory commitments, as every
additional economic cost might worsen their position vis-à-vis their com-
petitors. Only when companies manage to agree on common activities with
their major competitors can these disadvantages be avoided. Therefore,
Haufler (2001a: 24) suggests that especially oligopolistic markets, in which
only a comparatively small number of firms exist, display the highest prob-
ability of corporate self-regulation.
(iv) Conjectures about Conflict Characteristics. Private contributions to pub-
lic security could vary with the conflict issue, phase, and intensity. The issue
of a conflict, crudely speaking, refers to what the fighting is about. Intrinsic
conflict issues, such as ethnicity or religion, appear complex and sometimes
insoluble. However, if economic factors, such as greed or grievance (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2001) appear to be very prominent in the conflict, for example
in ‘economies of violence’, one could argue that there may be more leverage
for private sector engagement.17
A ‘conflict sensitive business’ (Banfield et al., 2003: 13; Fort and Schipani,
2003: 387) can try to anticipate and to prevent conflict in the first place 
(pre-conflict stage); it can take measures to reduce the level of already
existing violence (conflict stage) or can contribute to the establishment of
public institutions (post-conflict peace-building) (Banfield et al., 2003: 5, 15)
to prevent a fallback into physical violence. The (re-)establishment of func-
tioning governance structures increases long-term investment opportunities,
reduces operational costs and allows for the reallocation of states’ resources
from the military sector to education or private sector development (Nelson,
2000). As the discussion of the different forms of security in section 2 sug-
gests, the greatest amount of business activity can be expected at the conflict
stage or in post-conflict peace-building. Protective measures aimed at
enabling business corporations to remain in a zone of conflict and to continue
their business (such as securing business facilities, protecting personnel and
infrastructure) during ongoing conflicts or in unstable post-conflict periods
Conjecture 9: The likelihood of CSecR activities increases the more conflict
is dominated by economic issues.
Conjecture 8: CSecR activities are most likely in small, oligopolistic markets.
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appear to be the most likely direction of engagement because they have direct
and immediate benefits. Even though any post-war reconstruction may be
much more expensive than the prevention of a conflict in the first place
(Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 109), the very concrete costs involved in pre-
vention, including those of free-riding, on the one hand, and the potential
(at best indirect and only rather long-term) benefits to be derived from 
prevention measures, on the other hand, render conflict prevention — nota
bene the type of security-related activity that comes closest to the provision
of security as a public good — a highly unlikely case for corporate security
responsibility activities. This finding is interesting, because it seems to imply
that not even proactive security-related engagement necessarily comprises a
contribution to security as a public good, i.e. to CSecR in a narrow sense, as
the other conjectures suggested. In fact, corporations might be most inclined
to a proactive security-related engagement in conflict zones when this en-
gagement comprises a contribution to security as a private or club good.
Finally, and even more difficult to assess at the moment, is the potential rela-
tionship between the intensity of a conflict, or its ferocity/level of violence, and
the likelihood of CSecR activities. Since this point is at the very heart of our
conceptualizations, the research and empirical gaps revealed earlier entail a
lack of, or at the very least ambiguous, literature on which to base conjectures
regarding this point. From a purely logical point of view, both of the following
conjectures seem reasonable: higher levels of violence could have greater
effects on infrastructure and the day-to-day running of a business, which could
result in a higher likelihood of businesses to act. Alternatively, a more intense
conflict may appear more complex and overwhelming, resulting in a more
apathetic or passive approach by corporations.
5. Explaining Corporate Impact in Conflict Zones
Turning to impact as the dependent variable, the end of the ‘causal chain’ is
addressed in this section. We attribute three values to the possible impact
corporate behaviour can have on the level of violence in conflict zones:
doing no harm (no observable effect), doing good (reducing the level of vio-
lence) or doing harm (increasing the level of violence).
(v) Conjectures about the Forms of Engagement. In Figure 1 we distinguish
between four forms of corporate engagement: ‘take advantage’, ‘business as
usual’, ‘withdraw’ and ‘proactive’.We now employ these behavioural options
as a first cluster of independent variables (‘forms of engagement’) for
explaining companies’ impact on conflict. Presumably, neither taking advan-
tage of the economic temptations of war economies nor doing business as
usual can be considered as effective contributions to reducing the level vio-
Conjecture 10: The likelihood of proactive engagement is highest in mani-
fest conflicts or in post-conflict phases.
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lence. Mere compliance with an insufficient local regulatory environment,
which might also be considered as being a form of doing business as usual,
may at least ‘do no harm’ (Anderson, 1999). Further along this ‘intensity’
scale, companies could, for instance, disengage and withdraw from a conflict
zone in order not to become involved in violent interactions as accomplices
of warlords or irresponsible regimes. Even further along the line towards
proactive engagement, they could enter voluntarily into codes of conduct
and commit themselves to refraining from abusing regulatory or implemen-
tation gaps, avoiding violating human rights, shunning corruption and money-
laundering, and eschewing damaging the local environment or harming the
local community (Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 129, 133; Banfield et al., 2003: 15).
These behavioural options may still be static (Ganser, 2004a: 63), particu-
larly in the case of a gap between corporations’ commitments on the one
hand and their compliance with these commitments on the other. They may
therefore fall short from contributing to a substantial reduction in the level
of violence outside the immediate reach of corporate activities (Fort and
Schipani, 2001: 3; Dunfee and Fort, 2003: 574; Möckli et al., 2003: 53 f.; cf.
Ganser, 2004b: 69).
Proactive engagement can take different shapes.Wenger and Möckli (2003:
137–59) suggest donating money (funding) or material (in-kind support) to
preventive actors or goals (pp. 138–42), but also ‘strategic philanthropy’, which
includes the transfer of knowledge as well as sharing staff, managerial and
technological expertise (pp. 142–4). Fort and Schipani (2003: 415–25) suggest
fostering economic development for the marginalized (providing employ-
ment, training, youth and medical programmes), adopting good governance
principles (transparency), fighting corruption, nourishing a local sense of
community (intra-firm dialogue and political participation), and pursuing
active conflict mediation (two-track diplomacy) (cf. Dunfee and Fort, 2003:
597). Again, none of these policies or mechanisms has been systematically
tested with regard to their concrete impact and effectiveness, or the condi-
tions under which they work.
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withdraw
business as usual
take advantage
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(vi) Conjectures about Constellations of Actors and Coalition Patterns. The
impact of business engagement in conflict zones will assumedly depend on
the constellation and coalition patterns of the actors involved as well. No sin-
gle corporate actor will have the necessary capacity all by itself because ‘[t]he
causes of war are more multifaceted that any one business […] can eliminate’
(Fort and Schipani, 2001: 19; Rieth and Zimmer, 2004a: 30). Even the largest
transnational corporation would founder on organizing the large-scale trans-
formation of a country (Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 132, 144, 168; Ganser,
2004b: 60) and (re-)establishing public security.18 In failing and failed states,
corporate actors have to cooperate with the existing de facto authorities if they
want to continue with their business. In any case, commercial actors rely heav-
ily on public frameworks and state institutions, which guarantee property
rights, police fraud, and theft and enforce binding commitments (Dunfee and
Fort, 2003: 568; Scherer et al., 2004: 3f.). The effectiveness of private efforts at
providing public security would probably be seriously reduced if companies
acted unilaterally. Only a collective initiative — which will, however, also have
to be sponsored and supervised — is likely to overcome the negative incen-
tives of free-riding and defection (cf. Sherman, 2001: 8, 12; Lewis, 2004: 3, 8, 21).
The success of such an initiative could also depend on the mode of governance
employed, which could either be more horizontal (voluntary or equal part-
nership) or more hierarchical (primacy of the public sector/mandatory part-
nerships) (cf. Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 48, 55). The latter seems to be a
particularly promising candidate for contributions to a form of public security.
(vii) Conjectures about the Scope of Engagement. Finally, the impact of engage-
ment may also depend on whether business employs micro- and macro-level
activities. Micro-level measures, such as employee or community relations, tar-
get the local environment of the firm. For example, companies could invest in
the building of human capital (transfer of skills and expertise). New investment
decisions could occur either in the form of a policy dialogue with the local
community or as investments in the social development of local communities
and the private supply of public services not delivered by the government.
Macro-level measures target national or even international environments.
For example, a company could decide to invest in a country only if the gov-
ernment guarantees a just distribution of revenues, or it may even invest in
local administrative capacity to guarantee the former. Companies could also
refuse to pay bribes or adopt measures that increase transparency.
Conjecture 12: The highest impact on reducing the level of violence can be
expected in multiple-sector partnerships.
Conjecture 13: The impact of CSecR on reducing the level of violence
increases the more the public sector is involved.
Conjecture 11: Proactive forms of CSecR involve the highest impact on
reducing the level of violence in conflict zones.
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6. An Agenda for Comparative Research:
Where Do We Go from Here?
In summing up, future research on the role of business in conflict faces the
following challenges:
(1) Research will have to fill the empirical gap of descriptive studies with
regard to the positive role of corporations first, before it can move forward
to analyse the explanatory value of the various factors which could influ-
ence private corporations’ behaviour and its impact on conflict. In order to
discover the cross-sectoral potential of private contributions to security in
zones of conflict, empirical case studies will have to go beyond the extract-
ive industries sector which has prevailed so far.19
(2) Furthermore, conceptual clarifications are needed, given the ‘lack of
commonly agreed definitions and approaches, resulting in insufficient empir-
ical analysis of what works and what doesn’t, and in the blurring of bound-
aries between a number of related fields and terms’ (Nelson, 2004: 7). In
order to define CSecR in relation to the more encompassing field of CSR, the
meaning of key concepts such as ‘security’, ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict zone’ has to
be clarified. If we subscribe to the commonly accepted view that underdevel-
opment, distributional injustice, environmental degradation and human rights
abuses are all somehow related to security — all these components are part
of the notion of ‘human security’ (Suhrke, 1999; Nelson, 2000; Humphreys,
2003; Wenger and Möckli, 2003) — then almost everything corporations 
do would have to be considered a form of CSecR-relevant engagement.
Removing or fostering the breeding-ground of civil conflict, however, is the
very issue which has already been taken up in the CSR research agenda. In
order to shed more analytical light on the blind spots which have been neg-
lected within that agenda, we suggest framing the realm of corporate security
responsibility more narrowly so that it can be clearly distinguished. The
choice for such a concentration is, however, not without consequences for the
underlying notions of what constitutes a conflict, a conflict zone and what
security means.
To start with the latter term, our understanding of security would have to be
narrowed down from the all-inclusive concept of human security to situations
which are characterized by the imminent threat, the actual manifestation, or
the risk of a fallback into the use of direct physical violence. Accordingly, the
mere existence of latent structural violence would not suffice to talk of a zone
of conflict in this more focused sense. Instead, zones of conflict would always
require some kind of state failure.This concentration would still leave enough
room for analysing the contributions of business in all three phases, i.e. conflict
prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.
(3) Thirdly, and on the basis of an enlarged empirical base, research
would have to address the causal dimensions which underlie the motiv-
ations of corporations, the mechanisms by which these motivations translate
Conjecture 14: Macro-level initiatives are likely to generate a higher impact
of CSecR on reducing the level of violence.
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into forms of engagement and the conditions under which this engagement
has a specific impact. It still has to be seen if and how the analytical chal-
lenge of attributing changes in the level of violence to certain forms of
engagement of transnational corporations can be methodologically solved.
(4) Last, but not least, the normative dimension has not been sufficiently
conceptualized so far. Why should we want private actors to take over pub-
lic security functions in the first place? To be sure, private governance or de-
governmentalization has been apparent within and beyond nation-states
before. But this still leaves open the issue of meta-governance. Every time
business engages in public tasks, a problem of legitimacy arises when the
private provision of public goods is not accountable to transparent and par-
ticipatory institutions (Wenger and Möckli, 2003: 168, 170; Bexell, 2004: 108;
Scherer and Palazzo, 2004: 39 f.).The existence of a (public) shadow of hier-
archy seems to be a presupposition for private governance to meet the
demands of input legitimacy (Wolf, 2005: 223). Consequently, Möckli et al.
(2003b) claim that the engagement of the business sector in the prevention
of conflicts is only acceptable if it goes beyond ‘pure’ corporate initiatives
and should be embedded in public–private patterns of governance, includ-
ing national (host and home) governments, international organizations and
the participation of NGOs.When it comes down to failed states, attractive can-
didates for public authorities are mostly absent. Where, given these circum-
stances, should the authority to exert meta-governance functions be located?
With whom should private actors cooperate and to which regulatory frame-
work should they respond? What kind of public control and authorization
could be set up to make private corporations accountable and to ensure
that their contributions to security correspond to the public interest? Or
should corporate actors simply take over the provision of security altogether?
As our discussion of private and public forms of security indicated, they do
not have a genuine interest in providing public goods. This might lead to an
exclusive provision of security as a club good or a private good for those who
can afford it. The result could be a kind of ‘Swiss cheese’ supply of security
(Leander, 2005: 615), which would lead to a further deterioration in public
order and could effectively hamper any attempt to re-construct it.Therefore,
CSecR must in any case be restricted to re-establishing state functions in a
transition period.
Notwithstanding these rather inconclusive normative considerations, we
would still claim that private corporations can make meaningful contribu-
tions to new forms of security governance — under largely still unknown
circumstances. Further CSecR research will yet have to provide well-founded
advice for the management of armed conflicts in a way compatible with the
requirements of good governance.
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1. Additionally, in many armed conflicts today, private security providers
(PSPs), such as MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) or DynCorp,
provide military services and police skills, e.g. strategic advice and training, arms
procurement, intelligence gathering, logistics and factory security services (Avant,
2005). Even participation in armed combat with specialized military personnel is on
offer (Shearer, 1998; Avant, 2005; Lock, 2001: 218–22; Renner, 2002: 19f.; Wenger
and Möckli, 2003: 168; Ganser, 2004b: 67; Binder, 2004).
2. UN Secretary General, Press Release SG/SM/9256, SC/8059, 15 April 2004.
3. Private corporations operating transnationally may be involved or engaged in
these ‘economies of war’ in several ways. They can directly fuel and perpetuate con-
flict (cf. Sherman, 2001: 6f.; Renner, 2002: 58; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003) by con-
tributing the hardware of wars, such as small arms or land mines. In addition, illegal
business transactions, such as the trade in illicit drugs and narcotics (cf. Segell, 1999;
Lock, 2001: 206; Renner, 2002: 35–9) or black market money laundering may also
deliberately profit from war and directly contribute to conflict. In contrast to these
activities, the legal trade in natural resources such as oil, timber and diamonds is
assumed to contribute to conflict indirectly and unintentionally (cf. Ballentine and
Nitzschke, 2004: 38f.). Nevertheless, oil, gas and mining corporations in particular
have been accused of turning a blind eye to the negative effects of their commercial
involvement in civil wars and failing states.
4. Examples often include African countries, among them Somalia, Rwanda,
Liberia, Nigeria, Congo and Sudan, but also Colombia (South America) and
Indonesia (South-East Asia).
5. Some of them investigate whether rationalist (material or social costs) or
sociological (norm-based identity) factors matter more and under what conditions
they prevail. In addition, some studies have already started to investigate the causal
process through which agent behaviour changes (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004a). See
also Nelson (2000: 28, 58) and Banfield et al. (2003: 5).
6. Notable exceptions are, among others, Nelson (2000), Haufler (2001a, 2004)
or Wenger and Möckli (2003).
7. The term ‘stakeholders’ includes all those who have a ‘stake’ in the company’s
business, such as their clients, shareholders, creditors, employees and business partners.
8. In 72 countries the security risk of investment is rated at least as medium
(Nelson, 2000: 1).
9. This applies in particular to the extractive industries, whose local investments
are not that easily withdrawn. In addition, although it might be morally appropriate
and congruent with the demands of NGOs, disinvestment could also contribute to
catalysing existing conflicts through economic decline (Rittberger, 2004: 22).
10. It has to be noted, however, that the boundaries between private and public
security are flexible and depend on the character of their provision. Even if protec-
tion may appear to be an example of the privatization of security, any corporation
that engages in the protection of public infrastructure, such as airports or schools,
also contributes to public security.
11. Presumably, the actual causal relationships are not as linear, but much more
reflexive, than both figures suggest. This renders the attributes ‘independent’,
‘dependent’ and ‘intervening’ used in both figures somewhat arbitrary. For example,
‘coalition patterns’, which are indicators with which the ‘dependent’ variable
‘engagement’ can be described (unilateral or collective corporate behaviour, public
outsourcing of security, public–private partnerships), can also be discussed as factors
that may help to explain negative, neutral or positive impact; see also (v), pp. 310–11
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12. We take the term ‘proactive’ engagement from a categorical distinction intro-
duced and used by Nelson (2000) and Banfield et al. (2003: 5). However, we do not
employ their categories in toto, because by treating ‘comply’, ‘do harm’, ‘do no harm’
and ‘proactive’ engagement as one set of dependent variables the important dis-
tinction between the output, outcome and impact dimensions is lost.
13. Prominent examples include the case of Talisman Energy in Sudan (Bexell,
2004: 111–18; Lewis, 2004) and Mannesmann and BP in Colombia (Rieth and
Zimmer, 2004b: 87–91), Shell in Nigeria and Elf in Burma — all part of the extract-
ive industries (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004: 41).
14. See, for example, Shell in Nigeria (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004b: 86), Exxon
Mobil in Aceh and Unocal in Burma.
15. See, for example, Shell and the Brent Spar boycott or Nike and the anti-
sweatshop campaign (Ganser, 2004b: 72).
16. See, for example, Levi Strauss’s withdrawal from Burma or Talisman’s — a
Canadian oil company — withdrawal from Sudan after heavy public criticism (Rieth
and Zimmer, 2004a: 1).
17. See, for example, Grosse-Kettler’s (2004: 2 f.) selection of the Somalia con-
flict, which differs from the conflicts in Sudan, Liberia and Congo, as it was not a
typical self-financing resource war.
18. The opportunities for free-riders also discourage companies from acting uni-
laterally and call for collective conflict-prevention initiatives instead (cf. Lewis,
2004: 3, 8, 21; Sherman, 2001: 8).
19. Studies in this field include the so-called ‘Kimberley Process’, which regulates
the formerly illegal purchase of ‘conflict diamonds’ under international certification
standards; the ‘Chad–Cameroon pipeline project’, in which the World Bank, the gov-
ernment of Chad and the Exxon Mobil/Chevron/Petronas consortium agreed on a
‘revenue management plan’ (Sherman, 2001: 11, 17; cf. Renner, 2002: 60f.; Rittberger,
2004: 27f.); or the ‘Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’ in which the UK
government demanded that the extractive industry make public its payments to
local rulers in order to increase transparency and to reduce corruption.
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